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STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of her motion
to suppress evidence. The question is whether the officer here had
justification to search her person affects based on observing she
being in possession of a dollar bill and her passenger a butane
lighter.
STATEMENT OF CASE
The defendant is charged with Possession of a Controlled
Substance with the Intent to Distribute. The date of the offense
alleged is May 2, 2004.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. The defendant
challenged the stop and further detention of the defendant
specifically the search of her person and property. Defendant
alleged a violation of her rights as guaranteed by our Constitutions
protecting her from unreasonable searches and seizure. The trial
court ruled found that this was a level three detention but the officer
had probable cause to conduct the search.

The Court denied defendant's motion from the bench without
written findings. However, the Court did note that the officer must
have probable cause to search the defendant's car— a level three
stop. Motion to suppress hearing, Page 37 Line 6-9. However, the
Court found the officer did have probable cause. The probable cause
was based on two legal acts: 1) defendant possessing a rolled up
dollar bill and 2) the passenger holding butane lighter. Motion to
Suppress Hearing, Page 38 Line 17-25.
The defendant, with the stipulation of the Prosecution and with
concurrence of the Court, preserved the issue respecting the denial
of her motion to suppress. Defendant entered this "Sery Plea" on
December 1, 2005.
FACTUAL STATEMENT
Defendant motions this Court to suppress evidence herein.
Defendant asserted that the officers herein conducted an illegal stop/
search of the defendant. Defendant contends that this is in violation
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I
Section 14, Utah State Constitution.

On May 2, 2004, the officer stopped to check a blue 1990
Chevrolet Camaro on SR 6, milepost 210. The officer's initial
approach was at 7:55 a.m. Evidentiary Hearing Page 25 Line 4. The
approach, search and then detention continued till approximately
10:00 a.m. Evidentiary Hearing Page 25 Line 13.
The defendant was in the driver's seat and a male was in the
passenger seat. The car was running. The car had pulled up to the
convenience store next to a working phone booth. Page 20 Line 1112. The officer noted no criminal violations pulling almost directly
behind the Camaro. Evidentiary Hearing, Page 20 Line 7-10.
The officer approached the car. The female defendant was
leaning over the center console. Evidentiary Hearing, Page 21 Line
21. The officer saw an object in her hand. As she responded to the
officer's tap on the window, the officer noted that an object dropped
from her hand. He noted it to be a rolled up dollar bill. Evidentiary
Hearing, Page 22 Line 1. He saw in the passenger's hand butane
lighter and napkin. Evidentiary hearing Page 22 Line 7.

The officer believed the lighter to be paraphernalia. Evidentiary
Hearing, Page 23 Lines 4-6; Page 23 Lines 14-16. At page 24 lines
15-21 . He stated:
Defense Counsel: And you told them at that time, well, tell me
again what you said about the butane lighter. Line 15.
Officer: I said I recognized this lighter as
paraphernalia in my training and experience, I'm going
to ask you to step from the carDefense Counsel: Okay.
He, however, conceded that the lighter and dollar bill has many
legal uses; neither item was necessarily paraphernalia. Evidentiary
Hearing, Page 32 Line 19-23. Page 22 Line 14. Page 23 Lines 20-22.
Based on the officer's conclusion that the lighter was
paraphernalia, the officer then asked the defendant driver and the
passenger to step outside the car. They submitted to his authority.
Evidentiary Hearing Page 23 Line 7. He then commences a search
of the car including their personal property.

The trial court found the stop initially to be a level one stop as
the officer approached the car. The Court further found that no
detention had been made at that point.
However, the Court noted that when the officer ordered them
from the car, the detention had risen to a level three stop requiring
probable cause. Evidentiary Hearing Page 37 Line 6-9. The trial
court found that the officer's search was not a Terry' search or level
two encounter. The State agreed that the search was a level three
detention. Evidentiary Hearing, Page 37 Line 22.
Contrary to the Court and prosecutor's position, the officer
conceded that he did not have probable cause to arrest. Evidentiary
Hearing, Page 23 Line 24 through Page 24 Line 2. The officer did
not present any safety concerns respecting any weapons.
No consent was given. She merely submitted to the officer's
command to step from the car. Evidentiary Hearing Page 24 Line 814.
Defendant contends that the possession of a lighter does not
constitute probable cause to arrest nor search independent of arrest.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly ruled that the officer escalated to
the detention to a level three detention requiring a finding of
probable cause to search.
The officer's observations of a rolled up dollar bill, a
lighter and a napkin do not equal probable cause to search. Both
acts are legal alone or together.
Parallel to the escalation of the encounter from a level
one to a level three detention, a parallel mandate requires an officer
to possess additional cause. Probable cause must be present to
curtail an individual's freedom as here.
This Court should find that legal conduct alone or
together can never justify probable cause.
DETAILED ARGUMENT
The defendant asserts the search of the car by officers herein
was in violation of the defendants constitutional rights granted to the

defendant by the United States Constitution and the Utah State
Constitution.

PRESUMPTION OF UNREASONABLENESS
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. The language is almost
identical and provides as follows:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized.
The balance between the public interest and the individual
Constitution guaranteed right, personal security and privacy, tilts in
favor of freedom from police interference. Brown v. Texas, U.S. 47
(1979). This Court has a responsibility to jealously guard the rights
of the citizens of this State against a violation of their civil liberties.
State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002).
LEVEL OF ENCOUNTERS
As a general framework, there are three differing levels of
police encounters with the public. State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616,

617 (Utah 1987). State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah.Ct.App.
1989). Each level has differing legal significance. Each requires a
differing and corresponding level of cause. State v.Naranio, 2005 Ut
App 281. State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002).
A level one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is
consensual — wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive
questioning by an officer. The trial court found the initial approach
to the defendant's care to be a level one encounter.
A level two encounter involves an investigative detention or a
detention authorized under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Although it is a Fourth Amendment seizure, probable cause is not
required. Rather, when "specific and articulable facts and rational
inferences give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is
committing a crime, an officer may initiate an investigative detention
without consent. The detention should be brief and non-intrusive.
State v. Naranio, 2005 Ut App 281. State v. Deitman, 739P.2d616,
617 (Utah 1987). State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002).

Terry v. Ohio limits the police officer to a "search" of a person
that the officer reasonably believes (1) is involved in a crime; (2) is
armed; and (3) is presently dangerous to the officer, the public, or the
person to be searched. Moreover, "[a] search for weapons in the
absence of probable cause to arrest. . . must, like any other search,
be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation,"
and cannot stray into a general search for evidence of wrongdoing.
State v. Naranio, 2005 Ut App 281. The officer had no safety
concerns.
Here the officer ordered the defendant from her car and
required her to submit her property to search. This search exceeded
any authorization under Terry v. Ohio. See also State v. Naranio,
2005 Ut App 281. State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, 107 P.3d 706.
The trial court found this encounter escalated from a level
one to a level three detention. A level three encounter is
characterized as highly intrusive (searching personal property) or
lengthy detention (exceeding two hours here).

At level three, the officer must have probable cause to justify
the search the defendant's car and property. To justify this greater
intrusion upon personal liberty, greater cause is mandated.
The legal standard is 'probable cause' that a criminal offense
has occurred versus a 'reasonable suspicion' that a person maybe
committing a crime.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The trooper's testimony was that his probable cause was
based solely on him seeing the passenger in possession of butane
lighter, he deemed paraphernalia. Upon seeing the same, he felt he
had authority to search for additional paraphernalia. He had also see
dollar bill falling from her hand and starting to unfurl. The passenger
was also holding a napkin. No controlled substances were noted.
The search was for the purpose of locating paraphernalia other than
the lighter.
To justify this search, the officer must have probable cause to
believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense.
Probable cause determinations are reviewed under an "'objective
standard: whether from the facts known to the officer, and the

inferences [that can] fairly . . . be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and
prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified in believing
that the suspect had committed the offense"' for which he was
arrested . State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983).
'We examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then
decide ' whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of
an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to' probable cause."
Maryland v. Prinqle. 540 U.S. 366, 124 S.Ct. 795, 800 (2003).
As noted in Maryland v. Pringle, the probable-cause standard
is incapable of precise definition. However, "the substance of all the
definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt", and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect
to the person to be searched or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.
85, 91 (1979).
The defendant thereby perceives the question here is whether
the officer had reasonable ground for belief of guilt. Here, the belief
in guilt is based on the observations of the passenger possessing a

butane lighter (having multiple innocent uses) and the defendant
dropping a dollar bill unfurling.
Do these limited observations formulate a reasonable ground
of guilt? Do the simple possession of a dollar bill (rolled up or not)
and a butane lighter constitute a criminal offense? No. Should legal
acts ever justify a finding of probable cause?
There is nothing observed which would formulate any grounds
to arrest for any offense. To the officer's observations no offense
was committed. A combination of legal acts may create a suspicion
of wrongdoing, but they should never create probable cause to
arrest.
At best, the observations are a basis for the officer' suspicion.
Based on this suspicion, his authority is limited to diligently pursuing
his investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions. He
cannot conduct a general search based on a suspicion, reasonable
or not.
In State v. Naraio. this Court held that the officer may conduct
a 'Terry' frisk based on reasonable cause but he may not extend the

search beyond a search for weapons. The search of the defendant
for evidence is never authorized under the level two encounters. The
officer there became concerned that Narajo might be concealing
something around the area of his waist. He then lift Narajo's right
pant leg, causing a bindle to drop to the ground. The purpose of the
search there was beyond the search for weapons and for weapons.
The Court found that search to be illegal.
In State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, 107 P.3d 706, the officer
detained Chism to conduct a computer check on his identification.
The officer's only basis for detaining Chism was the suspicion that
Chism was underage to possess tobacco. Chism had produced
identification dispelling a reasonable person's suspicion. This Court
concluded that no reasonable basis to further detain Chism existed
after he presented identification. For the officer to go farther, the
office had to have additional cause.
In State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, 89 P.3d 185, this Court
found that the officer lacked probable cause to believe that the
defendant was driving with a drug metabolite. There the officer had

stopped the defendant for speeding. The officer had noted the
presence of air fresheners and the occupants had started to smoke
cigarettes as the officer approached. The office than ran warrants
check on the driver to find none. The officer than noted that the driver
had a prescription eye glass restriction on his license. Although the
was wearing sunglasses, the driver advised that he just had eye
surgery removing the necessity for the glasses.
The officer then continued further. He had the defendant
remove his sunglasses and noted red eyes. The officer also noted
the presence of a green tinge on the driver's tongue and droopy
eyelids.
The trooper noted no visible drug paraphernalia, no signs of
recent drug use, and no odor of marijuana emanating from either the
car or from Hechtle. The Court assumed the trooper's suspicions of
drug use may have been reasonable but noted the officer did nothing
to confirm his suspicions. He then arrested the defendant for driving
with a drug metabolite. The trooper performed no field sobriety tests

and made no attempt to involve a certified DRE to validate his
suspicions.
The Court concluded that to justify this arrest, probable cause
was needed to believe a crime had been committed. Taken as a
whole, the Court found the facts articulated by the trooper weighed
against finding of probable cause. This Court found the presence of
multiple air fresheners and other masking agents, as well as the
condition of Hechtle eyes may have been suggestive of possible drug
use, but they did not create probable cause to arrest.
Here the officer commences a probable cause search of the
car and defendant's property based on much less—butane lighter
and a dollar bill. There was no suggestion of any odor indicative of
illegal drug use and no other indicators were present.
The probable cause was limited to legal behavior—dollar bill
and a lighter. Probable cause should never be based on legal
conduct.
CONCLUSION

The officer here searches the defendant's property based on
suspicion of possible wrongdoing. To search her property required
probable cause to justify an arrest. The arrest was based on two
legal acts; possessing a dollar bill and her companion a butane
lighter. Neither factors are illegal alone or together.
Although the Court found probable cause present, the officer
conceded he lacked probable cause to arrest. He conceded that
possessing either the dollar bill or the lighter is not criminal and could
not justify an arrest.
This Court should reverse the decision of the trial court. This
conviction is based on evidence obtained through a violation of the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and Art. I Section 14 of the
Utah State Constitution. Legal conduct may create cause to suspect
but it should never create a basis to arrest.

DATED this 29th day of AuausLJ2005.
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Addendum to Brief
1. Court Findings and Ruling from Transcript.

1

MR. CARTER:

2

THE JUDGE:

3

MR. LOW:

I'll submit it on the brief, Judge.
Mr. Low?
If he's submitting, just as to that last

4

point whether consent was requested or not I think he had a

5

level-2 basis anyway.
THE JUDGE:

6

Well you can't, a level-2 is then you,

7

you can do further investigation.

8

have to have probable cause or you have to have consent.

9

Correct?

10

MR. LOW:

11

THE JUDGE:

12

cause or did he have consent?
MR. LOW:

13

But to make a search you

That's correct, Your Honor.
So did he have, did he have probable

I would say he had both.

And he

14

certainly had probable cause regardless, Your Honor.

15

don't know how the evidence that he observed there could be

16

anything but probable cause.
THE JUDGE:

17
18

MR. LOW:

20

THE JUDGE:

22

really.

25

Is reasonable suspicion.

That's correct.

So this would have to be level-3

Okay.
MR. LOW:

Okay
COURT'S RULING

23
24

I mean level-2, level-2 is,

reasonable suspicion.

19

21

Okay.

I

THE JUDGE:

The Court having heard the testimony

at preliminary hearing, having heard further testimony here

COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE 37

1

today, having reviewed the memorandums submitted by counsel,

2

the Court does find that the initial contact between the

3

officer and the individuals in the vehicle was a level-1

4

stop.

5

respect to safety questions or other, other reasons to assist

6

and help the public along the road.

7

he doesn't detain them or stop them, here they were already

8

stopped.

9

individuals wanted to have left, to leave I don't think that

An officer has those type of stops all the time with

And he can, as long as

The videotape and the pictures if, if these

10

they were prevented from doing so.

It might have been a

11

little bit difficult but they were clearly not to the level

12

as cited by some of the case law where someone has pinned you

13

in or where, where they've got their, the officer's got their

14

lights on indicating that he wants them to not move from the

15

area.

16

makes certain observations that they are leaned forward in

17

towards the console area.

18

He observes the defendant Ms. Griffith raise her hand, she

19

has something in her hand, he sees a rolled up currency fall

20

from her hand.

21

person a napkin and a butane lighter.

22

in and of themselves are innocent and they have innocent

23

reasons.

24

training and experience, he's testified that he's observed

25

similar items with respect to drug usage.

The officer then approaches, taps on the window,

They...

He then startles them.

And he also observes in the hand of the other
Clearly those items

But taken together based upon the officer's

COURT PROCEEDINGS
PAGE 38

And given those circumstances the Court finds that

1
2

he had probable cause to believe that they were drug

3

paraphernalia and could therefore make a search to determine

4

to find those items.

5

probable cause to make a further search with respect to

6

additional paraphernalia, found the black bag which contained

7

the methamphetamine.

8

those observations of, of together of the rolled up bill and

9

the paraphernalia and their leaning towards each other

He found those items.

He then had

If, if he hadn't made the initial,

10

towards the console and from his training and experience that

11

that is probable cause or potential drug use, he would not

12

have had the right to have requested them to exit the

13

vehicle.

14

denies the motion to suppress.

But the Court finds that he did.

15

MR. LOW:

16

THE JUDGE:

17

MR. CARTER:

19

THE JUDGE:

20

MR. CARTER:

THE JUDGE:

23

MR. LOW:

25

This matter is set for trial in a

December 1st if I recall correctly.
That's a week from n e x t —
Next Wednesday, a week from this

coming Wednesday I think.

22

24

Thank you, Judge.

couple of weeks.

18

21

Therefore,

Yes.

Okay.

Thank you.

Thank you, Judge.

Motion to withdraw

exhibits I guess.
THE JUDGE:

Mr. Carter, do you want your

COURT PROCEEDINGS

